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Abstract 
 
In recent years, inland navigation networks benefit from the innovation of the 
instrumentation and SCADA systems. These data acquisition and control systems lead 
to the improvement of the management of these networks. Moreover, they allow the 
implementation of more accurate automatic control to guarantee the navigation 
requirements. However, sensors and actuators are subject to faults due to the strong 
effects of the environment, aging, etc. Thus, before implementing automatic control 
strategies that rely on the fault-free mode, it is necessary to design a fault diagnosis 
scheme. This fault diagnosis scheme has to detect and isolate possible faults in the 
system to guarantee fault-free data and the efficiency of the automatic control 
algorithms. Moreover, the proposed supervision scheme could predict future incipient 
faults that are necessary to perform predictive maintenance of the equipment. In this 
paper, a general architecture of sensor fault detection and isolation using model-based 
approaches will be proposed for inland navigation networks. The proposed approach  
will be particularized for the Cuinchy-Fontinettes reach located in the north of France. 
The preliminary results show the effectiveness of the proposed fault diagnosis 
methodologies using a realistic simulator and fault scenarios. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main management objective of the inland navigation networks is to guarantee the 
navigation levels in each reach (Blesa et al., 2012), i.e. the Normal Navigation Levels 
(NNL). These levels are principally disturbed by the navigation and the lock operations. 
During lock operations, large volume of water is withdrawn from the upstream reach 
and supplied to the downstream reach causing a wave travelling in both directions; 
upstream to downstream, and downstream to upstream after reflection. To reduce the 
effect of wave and to maintain the NNL, it is necessary to control the gates which are 
generally located beside the locks.  Another possibility is to control the discharges from 
natural rivers. The water levels are controlled by gates and measured by tele-operating 
sensors. To achieve these aims, an adaptive and predictive control architecture has been 
proposed in (Duviella et al., 2013) as depicted in Figure 1. This architecture is based on 
a SCADA system allowing the tele-control of the navigation network. A Human 
Machine Interface (HMI) is dedicated to the supervision of the inland navigation 
network by a supervisor. The management constraints and rules are gathered in the 
Management Objectives and Constraints Generation module (MOCG). To perform the 
management of the inland navigation network, a Hybrid Control Accommodation 
module (HCA) allows the determination of set-points (Management Strategies block) 
according to the current state (Supervision block) and the forecasting of the future state 
(Prognosis block) of the network. These strategies can be adapted or improved 
according to the Decision Support module (DS).  
 
Figure 1- Inland navigation network adaptive and predictive 
control architecture. 
 
 
 
In this work, we will focus on the part of the supervision block that determines if a 
sensor fault is present in the system (detection) and identifies what sensor is affected by 
the fault (isolation). 
In particular, model-based fault diagnosis techniques will be used for the 
implementation of the sensor supervision block.  
 
 
2. MODEL-BASED FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
 
The principle of model-based fault detection is to test whether the measured inputs and 
outputs from the system are consistent with the behavior described by a model of the 
faultless system. If the measurements are inconsistent with the model of the faultless 
system, the existence of a fault is proved. In general, two different types of models can 
be distinguished: qualitative and quantitative models. Quantitative models are used in 
the Systems Dynamics and Control Engineering community (Gertler, 1998; Iserman, 
2006; Blanke et al., 2006; Ding, 2008) known as FDI (Fault Detection Isolation) 
community. Quantitative models are mathematical models that can be described in time 
or frequency domains and most of the fault detection techniques based on this kind of 
models uses a residual that describes the consistency check between the predicted,  
obtained by the model, and the real behaviour, y(k) measured by the sensors. This fault 
detection approach is known as based on analytical redundancy.  
 
2.1 Robust fault detection 
Ideally, in quantitative model-based fault detection methods, residuals should only be 
affected by the faults. However, the presence of disturbances, noise and modelling 
errors causes residuals to become nonzero in the absence of faults and thus interferes 
with the detection of faults. Therefore, the fault detection procedure must be robust 
against these undesired effects (Chen and Patton, 1999). 
 
In case parametric uncertainties are taken into account, the healthy system model should 
include a vector of uncertain parameters bounded by sets that contain all possible 
parameter values when the system operates normally.  
 
One of the most developed families of robust approaches, called active, is based on 
generating residuals which are insensitive to uncertainty, while at the same time 
sensitive to faults. This approach has been extensively developed by several researchers 
using different techniques: unknown input observers, robust parity equations, etc. In the 
book of Chen and Patton (1999), there is an excellent survey of this active approach. On 
the other hand, there is a second family of approaches, called passive (Puig et al., 2008), 
which enhances the robustness of the fault detection system at the decision-making 
stage. 
 
2.2 Interval model 
Let us assume that the system to be monitored can be modeled using a model which is 
linear in the parameters and can be expressed in discrete time regressor form as a 
Moving Average (MA) model: 
ˆ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( )y k k e k y k e k    φ θ                                             (1) 
where 
- ( , )k φ  is the regressor vector of dimension 1 n  which can contain any function of 
inputs ( )ku  and output ( )y k . 
-  is the transport delay that is unknown but belongs to a set of natural numbers:  
 0 0 0, 1,              with  0 ,     and 0    
- θ Θ  is the parameter vector of dimension 1n  .  
- Θ  is the set that bounds parameter values. In particular, for interval models, the set of 
uncertain parameters is bounded by an interval box centered in the nominal parameter 
values: 
                               1 1, ,n n           Θ    
where: 
-  0i i i   ; 0i i i     i=1,…, n , being 0i  the nominal parameter values; 
- ( )e k is the additive error bounded by a constant ( )e k  . 
 
The parameter set Θ  and additive error bound   are calibrated using fault-free data 
from the system (rich enough regarding the identification point of view) and in such a 
way that all measured data in a fault-free scenario will be covered by the interval 
predicted output produced by using model (1), that is 
  
ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) , ( )y k y k y k                                                     (2) 
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One of the key points in model based fault detection is how models are built and their 
uncertainty is estimated. The structure of the model, determined by ( , )k φ  and θ , 
nominal parameters  0θ  and  nominal transport delay 0  can be obtained by the physical 
knowledge of the system or by conventional identification techniques (Ljung, 1999). 
The additive error bound   can be determined by anlasying the noise statistics. The 
delay uncertainty    can be determined considering that the input process signal is 
white noise and carrying out the study of the independence between the input and 
output process signals using confidence intervals (usually, 99% or 95%). On the other 
hand, given N measurements of outputs and inputs from a scenario free of faults and 
rich enough from the identifiability point of view, the uncertainty in parameters ( i  
i=1,…, n ) can by computed by solving an optimization problem (Blesa et al, 2010). 
                                                  
2.3 Fault detection 
Once the model (1) has been calibrated in a non-faulty scenario, it can be used for fault 
detection checking if  
( ) ( )y k k                                                              (4) 
where ( )k  is the direct image of the uncertain model defined as 
  0 0 0ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) | ( ) ( , ) , , , , 1,
ˆ ˆ        ( ) , ( )
k y k e y k k e
y k y k
                    
     
φ θ θ Θ                     (5) 
In case that (4) is proved, a fault can be indicated; otherwise no fault is assumed to be 
present. Equivalently, the fault detection test (4) can be formulated in terms of the 
residual defined as 
ˆ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )r k y k y k e k y k k e k     φ θ                                (6) 
Residual (6) corresponds to a MA parity equation (Gertler, 1998). Ideally, when 
modeling errors and noise are neglected, residual (6) should be zero in a fault-free 
scenario and different from zero, otherwise. However, because of modeling errors and 
noise, residuals could be different from zero even in a non-faulty scenario. In order to 
take into account uncertainty in parameters and additive noise, the effects of these 
uncertainties will be propagated to the residuals defining the region of admissible 
residuals. A fault will be detected when zero does not belong to this set. Thus, the fault 
detection test is equivalent to check the following condition  
0 ( )k                                                                (7) 
where ( )k  is the interval of possible residuals defined as follows  
  0 0 0( ) ( ) | ( ) ( ) ( , ) , ,  , , 1,k r k r k y k k e e                   φ θ θ Θ         (8) 
This test based on the direct evaluation of the residual is known as the direct test (Blesa 
et al., 2011). 
 
2.4 Fault isolation 
Fault isolation consists in identifying the faults affecting the system once a fault has 
been detected. Fault isolation could be carried out, as classically proposed in FDI books 
(Gertler, 1998 and Isermann, 2006, among others). Given a set of nr residuals 
 1( ), , ( )rnr k r k  at time k,  the fault detection tests (4) or (7) applied component-wise to 
each single residual produces the observed fault signature 
 1 2( ) ( ), ( ), , ( )rnk k k k                                                (9) 
where 
0 if ( ) is consistent( ) 1 if ( ) is not consistent
i
i
i
r k
k
r k
  
                                               (10) 
The observed fault signature is, then, supplied to the fault isolation module that has the 
knowledge about the binary relation between the considered fault hypothesis set  
 1 2( ) ( ), ( ), , ( )fnk f k f k f k f                                            (11) 
and the fault signal set ( )k . This relation is stored in the theoretical binary fault 
signature matrix (FSM) of dimension r fn n . Thereby, an element FSMi,j of this matrix 
is equal to 1 if the fault hypothesis fj(k) is expected to affect the residual ri(k) such that 
the related fault signal fi(k) is equal to 1 when this fault is affecting the monitored 
system. Otherwise, the element FSMi,j is zero-valued. 
 
Considering single faults, a general approach to fault isolation is based on comparing 
the observed fault signature ( )k  with the theoretical one related to every fault 
hypotheses that can be calculated as the distance between both vectors: ( )k and the jth-
column of matrix FSM for the hypothesis fj, e.g. using the Hamming distance 
measurement. As a result of this comparison, a distance measurement disj(k) is obtained 
for every fault hypothesis fj, being dis(k) the vector of all the computed distances at time 
instant k:  1( ) ( ), , ( ), , ( )j nfk dis k dis k dis k  dis . If the Hamming distance approach is 
applied, then 
    ,
1
( ) FSM XOR ( )r
n
j i j i
i
dis k k

                                           (12) 
       
where XOR is the XOR logic operator. Then, the fault hypotheses with the shortest 
distance regarding the current observed fault signature ( )k  are considered as the fault 
isolation result:  
 1, ,:  if ( ) min ( )j j nff dis k dis k
     DGN f     (13) 
 
Thus, DGN denotes the set of fault hypothesis fj which are consistent with the observed 
fault signals. 
 
3. INLAND NAVIGATION MODEL 
Figure 2-Piece of inland navigation network of the north of France 
and its Scheme 
 
The real behaviour of every reach NR i   of the network, can be described by the Saint-
Venant (SV) equations (Chow, 1959) that are partial-differential equations describing 
accurately the dynamics in a one-dimensional free surface flow. These equations 
express the conservation of mass and momentum principles in a one-dimensional free 
surface flow: 
0Q S
x t
                                                                         .            
 2 0Q Q hgS gS I J
t x S x
           
                                (14) 
where ( , )Q Q x t  is the flow (in m3/s), ( , )S S x t  is the cross-sectional area (in m2), t is 
the time variable (in s), x is the spatial variable (in m), measured in the direction of the 
movement, h is the spatial variable corresponding to the water elevation (in m), g is the 
gravity (in m/s2), I  is the bottom slope and J  is the friction slope.  
 
Since there is no known analytical solution for equations (14) in real geometry, they 
have to be solved numerically. Then, the hydraulic behavior of this canal system can be 
simulated through numerical methods. Because of the complexity and the computational 
load of this complete distributed model several simplified models have been deduced 
from the SV equations with different simplifications (Bolea et al., 2014), as for example 
the IDZ model (Litrico and Fromion, 2004). The IDZ model is based on the 
linearisation of the SV equations around a set-point (in this case given by the NNL). 
The canal reach is divided into two parts: an upstream (uniform flow) part and a 
downstream (backwater) part. The relation between the level and the flow in these two 
parts is given by the following transfer function  
1 11 21 1
2 12 22 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
y s G G q s
y s G G q s
            
                                           (15)                            
where: y1 and y2 are the levels and q1, and, q2 are the upstream/downstream flow 
deviations from stationary values,  1111
1
1( ) p sG s
A s
 , 211221
1
( )
sp eG s
A s
 , 122112
2
( )
sp eG s
A s
  
and 2222
2
1( ) p sG s
A s
 . Discretizing (15) using a sample time Ts, the following MA models 
can be obtained 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1,1 1 1,2 1 2,1 2 21 2,2 2 21 1
2 2 2 2
2 2 1,1 1 12 1,2 1 12 2,1 2 2,2 2 2
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
y k y k b q k b q k b q k b q k e k
y k y k b q k b q k b q k b q k e k
 
 
          
                        (16) 
 
In inland navigation reaches, there can exist intermediate measurement levels and 
intermediate points were extra flows can be injected/extracted. Then, in a general case, a 
reach with yn  measurement level points and with qn  input/output flow points, the 
following model can be obtained 
 ,1 , ,2 ,
1
( ) ( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( )
qn
i i
i i j j j i j j j i i
j
y k y k b q k b q k e k 

           1, , yi n                 (17) 
that can be rewritten as  
( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i iy k k e k φ θ                              1, , yi n                        (18) 
 with 
 1 1, 1 1, ,( , ) ( 1), ( ), ( 1), , ( 1)q qi i i i i n n ik y k q k q k q k         φ                       
 1,1 1,2 ,21, , , , q Ti i ii nb b bθ                                                          (19) 
Since the IDZ is a physical-based model with a given structure, determined by ( , )i ikφ   
and iθ  1, , yi n   in (18)-(19),  nominal parameters 0iθ  and  nominal delays 0i  are 
given by the physical knowledge of the system (Litrico and Fromion, 2004). Finally, 
given input/output data from a scenario free of faults and rich enough from the 
identifiability point of view, the uncertainty in parameters and time delays around their 
nominal values can be estimated. 
 
4. FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION SCHEME 
Considering a navigation reach, described by (17),  with yn  measurement level points 
and  qn  input/output flow points, yn  different sensor faults can be defined 
( ) ( ) ( )nfi i iy k y k f k          1, , yi n                                 (20) 
where ( )nfiy k  is the real value of the level i and  and ( )if k the additive error fault that 
affects to level sensor i. 
 
Thus, yn primary residuals can be obtained as follows  
( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i i ir y k k e k  φ θ      1, , yi n                                 (21) 
Once the interval model has been calibrated, consistency test (7) can be applied to every 
residual (21). 
 
Regarding the fault isolation, considering the yn residuals affected by the possible 
yn faults, the Fault Signature Matrix defined in Table 1 can be obtained. 
 
Table 1- Fault Signature Matrix of residuals system (21) 
 1f  2f    1nyf  nyf  
1r  1 0 0 0 0 
2r  0 1 0 0 0 
   0 0    0 0 
1nyr   0 0 0 1  
nyr  0 0 0 0 1 
 
The problem of using model (17) in (21) for generating residuals, that allow sensor fault 
detection, is that it behaves as a dead-beat observer which can only indicate a fault for a 
minimum time period given by the system order. This implies that after a number of 
samples (related to the order of the system) once the fault has appeared, the residual 
tends to be small even the fault is still present (Ding, 2008). In order to deal with this 
problem, when an inconsistency is detected in residual ir  at instant fk  a new residual 
_ 2ir  is activated for fk k  
_ 2 ˆ( ) ( ) ( )i i ir k y k y k       1, , yi n                                            (22) 
with  ˆ ( )iy k  obtained by the following mass-balance average simulation model 
1ˆ ˆ( ) ( 1) ( )i i iy k y k Q kA                                                         (23) 
where A is the longitudinal area of the reach and the input average flow ( )iQ k  is 
computed as 
1
,
1 H
( ) ( )
qn k
i l l i
l j k
Q k q j

  
                                                        (24) 
 
and the initial condition of the simulation model is given by 
1
H
ˆ ( ) ( )
j kf
i f i
j kf
y k y j
 
 
                                                         (25) 
Then, the fault signature component  ( )i k  will be activated while the residual _ 2 ( )ir k  
will be bigger or equal a threshold _ 2i , i.e., 
_ 2 _ 2
_ 2 _ 2
0  if ( )( ) 1  if ( )
i i
i
i i
r k
k
r k


    
                                                         (26) 
where _ 2i   1, , yi n   are the detection threshold calibrated in a fault-free scenario. 
 
5. CUINCHY FONTINETTES REACH 
 
The Cuinchy-Fontinettes Reach (CFR) has a crucial importance due to its localization 
between two major catchment areas and its size (more than 40 km long). The main use 
of the CFR is for navigation purposes. However, it can be used to stock water volumes 
during wet periods in order to avoid or to limit floods in the two catchment areas, and 
during dry period to supply water to these two areas.  
 
The CFR is located between the upstream lock of Cuinchy at the East of the town 
Bethune and, at the Southwest of the town Saint-Omer, the downstream lock of 
Fontinettes (see Figure 3). The first part of the channel corresponds to the 28.7 km from 
Cuinchy to Aire-sur-la-Lys. The second part of the channel corresponds to 13.6 km from 
Aire-sur-la-Lys to Fontinettes. The channel is entirely artificial and has no significant 
slope. Considering the navigation flow, the water runs off from Cuinchy to Fontinettes. 
There are three measurement points in Cuinchy, Aire-sur-la-Lys and Fontinettes. The 
input/output flow points are located in: 
 
 Cuinchy where the flow can be injected by the lock operation (activated by 
navigation rules) and a submerged gate that can supply a controlled flow. 
 Aire where the flow can be injected/extracted by a controlled gate. 
 Fontinettes where the flow can be extracted by the lock operation (activated by 
navigation rules). 
 
Figure 3- Scheme of the Cuinchy-Fontinettes navigation reach 
 
Then, considering the discrete-time IDZ model, the system can be modelled by  
( ) ( , ) ( )i i i i iy k k e k φ θ                    1,2,3i                        (27) 
 with 
 1 1, 1 1, 2 2, 2 2, 3 3, 3,( , ) ( 1), ( ), ( 1), ( 1), ( 1), ( 1), ( 1)qi i i i i i i i n ik y k q k q k q k q k q k q k            φ     
 1,1 1,2 2,1 2,2 3,1 3,21, , , , , , Ti i i i i ii b b b b b bθ                                                (28) 
6. RESULTS 
6.1 Identification 
The nominal values of parameters in Eq. (27) have been obtained by the physical 
knowledge of the system and considering a sample time Ts=5 minutes. The values of 
these parameters are summarized in Tables 2, 3 and 4.   
 
 
Table 2-Cuinchy level equation 1y  nominal parameters 
0
1,1  02,1  03,1  1,01,1b  1,01,2b  1,02,1b  1,02,2b  1,03,1b  1,03,2b  
1 16 24 0.0063   -0.0062   0.0023   -0.0021   -0.0019   0.0018 
 
Table 3- Aire level equation 2y  nominal parameters 
0
1,2  02,2  03,2  2,01,1b  2,01,2b  2,02,1b  2,02,2b  2,03,1b  2,03,2b  
16 1 8 0.0023   -0.0021   0.0047   -0.0046   -0.0028   0.0027 
 
Table 4- Fontinettes level equation 3y  nominal parameters 
0
1,3  02,3  03,3  3,01,1b  3,01,2b  3,02,1b  3,02,2b  3,03,1b  3,03,2b  
24 8 1 0.0019   -0.0018   0.0028   -0.0027   -0.0042   0.0040 
 
 Once the nominal parameters have been computed, a fault-free scenario has been 
generated by numerical model implemented in the SIC (Simulation Irrigation Canals) 
software (Malaterre, 2006). SIC uses a finite difference method to solve the SV 
equations implicitly. The fault-free scenario defined by the input (positive) and output 
(negative) flow values in 6 days, based on a realistic scenario is depicted in Figure 4. 
Using this fault-free scenario and solving optimization problems (Blesa et al., 2010; 
Puig and Blesa, 2013), the uncertainty in parameters has been computed in such a way 
that the non-faulty data is contained in the interval bounds following Eq. (2).  
 
 
Figure 4- Input(positive)/output(negative) flow values in the fault-
free scenario 
 
 
The uncertain bounds in parameters obtained in the identification procedure are the 
following 
- Delay uncertainty: 2   for all the transport delays 
- Additive errors: 1 1,5cm  , 2 3cm    and 3 3.5cm   
- Uncertainty in parameters:  1 1,0, 1 ,1i j i jb b   ,  2 2,0, 2 ,1i j i jb b    and  3 3,0, 3 ,1i j i jb b    
with 1 0.066  , 2 0.027   and 3 0.008   
 
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the Cuinchy, Aire and Fontinettes levels and the bound 
levels obtained using the interval model.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5- Levels and interval bound levels in the fault-free 
scenario 
 
6.2. Fault detection 
Once the interval model has been calibrated, different fault scenarios have been 
simulated in order to verify the effectiveness in fault detection using Test (4) or (7).  
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the bounds of the interval residuals 1  in the Cuinchy 
level when an additive fault of -2cm has been introduced in this sensor level i.e 
1 0.02f m   at 990fk   (i.e. at time 82h 30’). Figure 7 depicts the details of Figure 6 
around the fault time occurrence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
Figure 6- Bounds of the interval residuals 1  (Cuinchy level 
residual) 
 
 
Figure 7- Detail of bounds of the interval residuals 1  (Cuinchy 
level residual) 
 
Finally, Figure 8 (upper) shows the fault detection results applying fault detection test 
defined in Eq. (7)  to 1r  and (lower) applying this fault detection test but with the 
additional residual 1_ 2r  defined in Eq. (22) in order to deal with the dead-beat observer 
effect described in Section 4. As can be seen if test (7) is directly applied to 1r , there is 
not persistence in the fault indicator, whereas this problem disappear when the auxiliary 
residual is used and there is persistence in the fault indicator.  
 
Figure 8- Fault detection results without and with additional 
residual 1_ 2r  
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In recent years, inland navigation networks have beneﬁted from the innovation of the 
instrumentation and SCADA systems. However, before implementing automatic control 
strategies that rely on the fault-free mode it is necessary to design a fault diagnosis 
scheme. In this paper, a model-based scheme has been proposed for the sensor level 
fault detection and isolation in inland navigation networks. The scheme is based on the 
use of analytical redundancy provided by a mathematical model. The fault detection is 
implemented by a passive robust approach based on interval methods that considers 
uncertainty in parameters of the mathematical model and additive error. Finally, the 
proposed scheme has been successfully validated in real scenarios using a high-fidelity 
simulator of a reach of the inland navigation network located in the north of France.  
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